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Abstract
The Article describes the phases of implementing the necessary measures according to Cybersecurity Regulation
for critical infrastructure and ISO 27032 standard. As a base for identification of the necessary measures in
transport organization the risk assessment has been done. The Risk Management Methodology has been
described as well as the results of the risk assessment. The main aspects of risk treatment with the most suitable
measures for Cyber risks are identified. Also as very important aspect of protecting critical transport
infrastructure we have identified the critical services and prepared business continuity plans. The main steps and
results in providing the acceptable level of availability and opportunities for continuity are presented and
explained.
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1. Introduction
In the last decades a lot of organizations have experienced different types of Cybersecurity attacks, such as
Ransomware, Internet of Things Botnets, Phishing and Whaling attacks, Business Process Compromise Attacks,
Machine Learning enabled attacks etc (Goud, 2017).
European Union has taken various steps to help companies and the critical infrastructure providers to implement
the necessary measures for achieving the acceptable level of security and continuity in delivering their services.
The Cybersecurity Regulation for critical infrastructure is in place and all providers have to conform to it.
Because of that the paper covers the most important phases of implementing the necessary measures according
to this Regulation and available international standards (ISO 27032, ISO27001, ISO 22301), and the practical
case study for Rail Infrastructure.
2. Methods
Some qualitative, as well as quantitative methods were been using in this paper. Relevant studies addressing the
issue of the different types of Cybersecurity attacks and their consequences will be analysed at the global level.
Observations will be systematized via the synthesis method. Also, existing methods (RA – Risk Assessment,
BIA – Business Impact Analysis, etc.) will be analysed, as well as the relevant literature that addresses the issues
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of Cybersecurity. The descriptive method was used for investigation and understanding types of Cybersecurity
attacks generally, and the specifics for critical infrastructure.
RA method has been applied for investigation of the most critical risks for Rail Infrastructure, and BIA for
identification of the most important services that Rail Infrastructure offers and that could be interrupted by
Cyber-attacks. The highly structured questionnaires were used in conducting risk assessment and business
impact analysis. The participants involved in applying these methods on rail infrastructure were the business
processes owners. With the analytic-synthetic method the relationship between the results of these methods (RA
and BIA), and suggested security measures was established through Risk Treatment Plan and Business
Continuity Strategy.
2.1 Risk Assessment Method
For risk assessment in the Railways Infrastructure company I prepared the methodology based on the guidelines
of ISO 31000 and ISO 27005. It is entirely suited to the needs of the organization to conduct a cyber risks
assessment.
Risk assessment was conducted to assess the likelihood of threats occurring with respect to the preventive
security measures implemented to mitigate the vulnerability and the impact once the threat occurs.
Likelihood is expressed using a predetermined method of grading the probability of occurrence of an event.
Because the distribution of the likelihood of threats occurring is widespread in practice (ranging from daily
unwanted events such as the occurrence of spam to events such as fires or terrorist attacks that occur once every
few decades), the scale will qualify as indicated in Table 1.
Table 1. Threat occurrence likelihood levels
 
Level Likelihood of threat
High This event is expected to occurin most cases.
Moderate Events can sometimes occur.
Low Occurrence of an event is notlikely.
Once the likelihood of a threat occurrence has been determined, it is necessary to evaluate the negative impact
that could appear if the threat successfully exploits the vulnerabilities. In this assessment one should use
previously obtained values of information assets, the purpose of the system, the importance of data for an
organization's operations, the sensitivity of data and the security measures that reduce the impact once the threat
occurs.
Impact assessment refers to the loss or compromise of any fundamental information system principles or a
combination of these principles, loss of the revenue, system repair costs, loss of public reputation, etc.
The impact value is qualified as defined in Table 2.
Table 2. Impact level
 
Level Impact
High Interruption of key services
Loss of significant assets
Serious environmental damage
Death
A significant loss of public reputation
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Public pressure for changes in organization
Endangering the integrity of the traffic
management, signal-safety or electrical-energy
subsystem
10 trains daily affected by the incident
Moderate
Interruption of some basic services
Loss of property
Certain adverse effects on the environment
Severe injuries
Partial loss of public reputation
Negative public opinion in the media
Low
Delay in deadline for less significant
processes/services
Loss of property (small value)
Temporary adverse effects on the environment
First aid treatment
Slower gaining of public trust
Partly negative attitude of the public
Based on the likelihood of the occurrence and the impact of the threat on the asset, the ultimate value of the risk
is determined. This is done according to the defined risk calculation matrix, listed in Table 3.
Table 3. Risk matrix
 
This risk matrix sets out the framework for selecting risk treatment options. For all unacceptable risks (risk level
greater than or equal to 6) measures will be identified to address that risk.
2.2 Business Impact Analysis Method
To ensure continuity in the provision of key services, the BIA - Business Impact Analysis method will be used.
Its purpose is to determine which business processes are necessary to ensure the continuity of key services in the
event of a major incident, and to prioritize their renewal. During the BIA, the impact of interruptions of business
process or activities on the overall organization's operations is analysed in detail. The goal of the analysis is to
collect data that is critical for selecting a business continuity strategy, implementation of the solutions, and
developing business continuity plans and procedures. The data mentioned, among other things include:
Relationships and interdependencies of the process internally and externally,
Tangible and intangible losses caused by interruption of the process,
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Recovery Time Objective (RTO),
Recovery Point Objective (RPO),
Minimum business continuity objective (MBCO)
Maximum acceptable outage (MAO)
The resources necessary to recover the functionality of process providing critical services in the event of
interruption.
Interruptions of key services as a direct effect have losses compared to the normal, undisturbed operations of
Rail Infrastructure company. There are two basic types of losses - tangible and intangible. The tangible losses
include those losses that can be quantitatively expressed. Most often, these are financial losses (decrease or
delay in revenue, increased operating expenses, etc.), since in most cases they can be estimated by analysing the
organization's operations. Other types of tangible losses include the reduction of services offered, loss of market
share, reduction of the number of users, penalties determined by the SLA contracts, etc.
Intangible losses are those losses that cannot be quantified but have a significant impact on the future
performance of the organization. These are, for example, loss of reputation, loss of customer trust, loss of
competitiveness, compromising customer safety, etc. For all identified losses, it is necessary to determine the
level of impact on the business. The following is an overview of the parameters estimated at Rail Infrastructure
company for each key service:
Lost revenue due to process interruption
Penalties for failure to comply with legal obligations
Penalties for non-fulfillment of contractual obligations
Operating costs of process renewal
The possibility of permanent loss of contracts with key user
Strategic importance for the owner
Strategic importance for business environment
Loss of reputation.
The assessment of each parameter was performed by a qualitative method according to the three-level scale of
impact (large, moderate, small).
3. Problem Analysis
In the last decades a lot of organizations have experienced different types of Cybersecurity attacks, such as
Ransomware, Internet of Things Botnets, Phishing and Whaling attacks, Business Process Compromise Attacks,
Machine Learning enabled attacks etc (Goud, 2017). A Cybersecurity attack is an assault launched by
cybercriminals using one or more computers against a single or multiple computers or networks. A
Cybersecurity attack can maliciously disable computers, steal data, or use breached computers as a launch point
for other attacks. Cybercriminals use a variety of methods to launch a Cybersecurity attack.
For Cybercriminals the very interesting subject of attack are critical infrastructures. The loss of service or the
damage to customer and public confidence can have dramatic consequences. Critical infrastructures include
health, emergency services, energy, financial services, food, government, water and transport. This paper is
about how to solve the problem of potential cyber-attacks in the field of rail transport.
Railways, as critical infrastructures, are a highly tempting security breach target. And as railways are embracing
automation by increasingly connected railway systems, this network creates a one-of-a-kind technical
complexity where firewalls, signature-based mechanisms and other network perimeters are not enough to cope
with internal or external cyber-threats. To determine how attacks on railways could be performed, British-based
computer security firm Sophos, in cooperation with Koramis of Germany, created project Honeytrain, (Milne, A.
2017). A model was set up as a honeypot to hackers of a mythical virtual rail transport control and operating
system, in order to gain information about the quality, quantity and aggressiveness of possible attacks. During its
operation of six weeks, a total of 2,745,267 cyberattacks on railway systems from several countries identified.
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Because of its critical role for rail safety and its increasing level of complexity, the signaling system, a critical
safety system that directs and manages railway traffic, is the most sensitive system and a cyber-attack on this
system could cause serious damage (e.g. human lives, economic losses, reputational damage, etc.). According to
cybersecurity experts, it is the weakest link within railway systems, UNIFE (2019). This weakness is due to
several factors, such as the prevalence of older equipment that is prohibitively expensive to upgrade, the
combination of IT and OT networks and most importantly, the lack of railway-specific cybersecurity solutions to
protect this critical system. Its vulnerability is increased due to the continued introduction of RIoT (Rail Internet
of Things) sensors and tools and by moving to the cloud. Generally, cyberattacks are becoming more frequent
and more sophisticated so it is very important to be able to identify them on time and to be prepared for
preventing these attacks or in the worst case be able to answer to the incidents.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
4.1 Regulations and Standards
Based on the above presented problem analysis and the trends in Cybersecurity attacks on critical infrastructure,
we can conclude that it is necessary to provide systematic approach in coping with this problem and finding the
appropriate solution.
The European Union Parliament and the Council have adopted the Directive (EU) 2016/1148 concerning
measures for high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union. According to
this Directive, EU Directive (2016), all Member States have to adopt a national strategy on the security of
network and information systems, create a Cooperation Group in order to support and facilitate strategic
cooperation and the exchange of information among Member States, create a computer security incident
response teams network in order to contribute to the development of trust and confidence between Member
States, establish security and notification requirements for operators of essential services and for digital service
providers, and designate national competent authorities. The Directive contains the list of entities that offer
essential services, and among them is rail transport, including infrastructure.
Following this Directive Croatia has adopted the National Strategy for Cybersecurity that covers the following
key areas of cyber security:
Electronic communications and information infrastructure and services, which is further divided into
public electronic communications, electronic government and electronic financial services,
Critical communication and information infrastructure and cyber crisis management,
Cybercrime.
Also Croatia has adopted the Regulation and the Act on cyber security for key service providers and digital
service providers. This Act regulates procedures and measures to achieve a high level of cyber security for key
services and digital service providers, as well as the criteria for identification of the incidents that have high
impact to providing critical services.
This regulatory EU and national framework offer the basic elements that could be taken into consideration in the
process of improving Cybersecurity measures implemented in critical services providers. Beside it, it is very
useful to apply international standards for information security, especially ISO 27001 Information security
management systems – Requirements ISO/IEC (2013), and ISO 27032 Guidelines for cybersecurity (ISO/IEC,
2012). The main steps of ISO 27032 implementation are, (Tomić Rotim, S. 2019):
Identification of all physical and virtual, personal and organizational assets. Under the asset we mean
information, software, hardware, services, people and some intangibles, such as reputation and image.
Risk assessment that means identification and analysis of threats and vulnerabilities. The results of risk
assessment are presented through Risk Assessment Report.
Business impact analysis for the purpose of identifying the most critical processes and the acceptable time
for recovering the critical services in the case of disaster.
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Determination and implementation of the appropriate cybersecurity measures. There are different kinds of
cybersecurity controls, such as: Application-level controls, Server protection controls, End-user controls,
Controls against social engineering attacks, Cybersecurity readiness controls and others.
The best option for all critical services providers is to combine the directions from the regulatory framework and
the best practices from the international standards. In the case of Rail Infrastructure and its critical services this
approach has been applied. The key performance indicators of the whole process and the implementing
measures show that this approach is successful.
4.2 Risk Assessment
For the core activities in the process model of the provision of key services, a risk assessment was carried out
and risk treatment measures were defined in accordance with the methodology described above. Table 4
provides an overview of the identified risks and security measures for the signal-safety system that is essential in
providing the key railway infrastructure management and maintenance services, including traffic management.
The signal-safety system was selected because it plays a critical role in railway safety, as stated in the previous
chapter.
Table 4. Overview of identified risks and security measures for management of the signal-safety system
 
No. Risk Security measure
1. Unauthorized access tosignal-safety devices
Rules on Information Systems Safety
Management (Physical Security)
Anti-theft locks
Instructions for workers of executive
service with a signal-safety and
telecommunication devices
Performing regular inspections and
testing of signal-safety devices







Instructions for maintaining the signal-
safety devices
Performing emergency maintenance,





between individual parts of
the signal-safety devices
Traffic Regulations
Instructions for workers of executive
service with a signal-safety and
telecommunication devices
Rules on maintenance of signal-safety
devices
Performing regular inspections and
testing of signal-safety devices
Activities for the protection of property
and premises
4. Irresponsible management of
critical assets and changes to
Instructions for workers of executive
service with a signal-safety and
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critical assets telecommunication devices
Rules on maintenance of signal-safety
devices
Performing regular inspections and
testing of signal-safety devices
Compliance with and enforcement of the
provisions of other general acts relating
to property






Instruction for workers of executive
service with a signal-safety and
telecommunication devices
Rules on maintenance of signal-safety
devices
6. Abuse by authorized persons
Rules on Information Systems Safety
Management (Access Control)
Limited number of persons with access
rights
Performing regular inspections and
testing of signal-safety devices
Activities for the protection of property
and premises
Staff awarness
Some of the security measures have already been implemented and some are in the process of implementation,
after which a new risk assessment needs to be carried out and the initial risk levels reduced. Risk assessment and
treatment ensures preventive action to reduce cyberattacks. Nevertheless, such attacks are still possible because
the risks cannot be reduced to zero. To ensure good corrective action in the event of an attack, a process for
managing cyber incidents and business continuity has been implemented. For incidents, the procedure for
reporting an incident is described, as well as the method of incident response and reporting. The incident
response process includes:
collection of evidence as soon as possible after the event,
conducting forensic analysis (if necessary),
escalation (if necessary),
assessing the need for corrective action,
implementation of appropriate corrective actions,
ensuring that all incident response activities are appropriately recorded for later analysis,
communicating the incident with relevant details to internal and external persons and organizations on a
need-to-know basis,
formal closure of incident after resolution,
checking if corrective actions are effective.
4.3 Business Impact Analysis
In order to prepare an adequate business continuity plan, the BIA was performed according to previously
described methodology. For the key railway infrastructure management and maintenance service, including
traffic management, all the processes on which that service depends are identified:
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Maintenance of telecommunications
Maintenance of electro-energy system
Maintenance of track upper and lower structure
The organization and regulation of traffic
Maintaining a business network
Maintenance of the transport network
Maintenance of signal-safety system
All resources for successful provision of this service have been identified. These include human resources,
vendor services, required data, registry phones, trackside radio, trackside telephone cables, station-to-station
signal ring, UHF and VHF system, wind sensors, SPEV (SCADA) system for EE system, SCADA remote
control centers, energy telecommunication cables, transformer stations, etc. Table 5 provides a description of the
key services.
Table 5. Description of the key services
Service Dependency description
Registry phones Record communications/conversations (ontelecommunication premises or in traffic offices)
Trackside radios Part of the radio dispatch system.
Trackside telephone
cables
For connections between the signal-man at the railway
stations, there are usually two lines on the same line.
Station-to-station signal
ring
Part of the traffic management system. Train direction
notification.
UHF and VHF systems
Communication between traffic staff within one station (for
example. train manoeuvring between tracks). Maintenance
people also use it if a physical connection has broken.
Wind sensors
The sensors are placed on the critical parts, gives information
to the staff, the information goes to the railroad dispatcher via
a cable connection.
Line cabinets and
telephones - parts of
traffic management
systems
Line cabinets and telephones for communication with traffic
offices.
Telephone exchanges
For tunnel work or bends, when outsourced companies do
maintenance, then they answer by telephone (make a








For video surveillance. Recorded locally on discs at stations.
SPEV (SCADA) system
for EE system




When entering the SPEV facility the system records that the
door is open.
Transformer stations To power the stations. In case of power failure there arebackup generators at the railway stations.
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IST system For maintenance of timetables of all trains (train data) –
planned and actual routes are recorded. If system does not
work for 1 day, data is retroactively entered – not connected
with traffic management. A maximum of 3 days can be
entered backwards if the IST does not work.
Mail
The telegrams are sent to inform about changes in relation to
the plan; if the mail does not work then it is reported via
phone.
Network devices
On railway stations in telecommunication cabinets. Remote
access to telephone exchanges, registry phones, video
cameras and recorders.
Optics (optic cables) For connecting network devices and external operators withoptic cable. There is a local cable along the main cable.
SS device Devices for securing stations, open rails and railwaycrossings.
Railroad light signals
For allowing and prohibiting train rides. Two-filament bulbs
are used to reduce risk. Bulbs have a detection system that
detects if the bulb does not work.
Switches Shift switches and control their position and accuracy. In theevent of a malfunction, the switch can be switched manually.
Devices for securing
railway crossings They allow and prohibit the driving of road vehicles.
CA Spectrum Incident reporting application system for Maintenancedepartment. SS is not connected.
These analyses have identified the criticalities of certain IT services necessary for the operation of Rail
Infrastructure, as well as the parameters describing the operational impact of the disruption of operation of
individual IT services on business. The analysis also defines the business requirements according to the
availability of IT services, in such a way that it determines the deadline within IT services can be recovered if
unacceptable losses for the company are to be avoided. The data collected serves as a basis for considering
possible BC strategies and selecting the most appropriate ones. The selection of the most appropriate strategies
or solutions is made on the basis of several criteria, the most important of which are:
Recovery Time Objective (RTO) - the timeframe for resuming minimum set of IT service functionality in
order to avoid unacceptable losses and compromise business sustainability,
Recovery Point Objective (RPO) - the point in time before which all stored data must be securely
preserved (the target frequency of backing up data to reduce losses to an acceptable level).
Implementation cost
Fulfillment of RPO parameters can be viewed from two aspects, the availability of data in case of failure and the
preservation of integrity during its disruption. Data availability is achieved through redundant copies, whether
on tapes, disk or any other medium.
Fulfillment of RTO parameters defines the difference in time that is currently required for the establishment of
IT services after the outage and the one defined. Reducing IT service recovery time and approaching target
recovery time (RTO) are achieved in various ways, the most common of which are:
establishment of redundancy,
preparing and ensuring the necessary preconditions for a faster recovery,
preparation of backup equipment,
education of employees,
designing an IT architecture that can use the established redundancy automatically or semi-automatically.
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The business continuity strategies to be considered are those that allow for renewal at a time equal to or less than
the established RTO and whose implementation cost does not exceed the maximum cost that the organization
has decided to tolerate in the event of an incident.
The Business Continuity Strategy covers all the resources necessary for the business, namely:
staff,
office space,





Key resources important to the business of Rail Infrastructure include numerous types of equipment, services
and communication. The strategies are divided by the aforementioned resources - different resources, namely,
require a different approach when developing a business continuity strategy. While, for example, for a typical
data center, it is best to build an alternative location where servers and associated services and applications will
be renewed, for resources such as data communications strategy is mostly confined to the realization of multiple
or alternative communication links.
Based on the selected strategies, business continuity plans and DR procedures have been made which are
necessary for the provision of key services.
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